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ABSTRACT
This report (Independent Functional Safety Assessment Guidance 7.0) is the last in a nine-
part series of recommendations and guidance addressing the functional safety of processor-
controlled mining equipment.  It is part of a risk-based system safety process encompassing
hardware, software, humans, and the operating environment for the equipment’s life cycle.  Figure
1 shows a safety framework containing these recommendations.  The reports in this series address
the various life cycle stages of inception, design, approval and certification, commissioning,
operation, maintenance, and decommissioning.  These recommendations were developed as a joint
project between the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and
Health Administra-tion.  They are intended for use by mining companies, original equipment
manufacturers, and after-market suppliers to these mining companies.  Users of these reports are
expected to consider the set in total during the design cycle.
•  1.0  Safety Introduction (Part 1).—This is an introductory report for the general mining
industry.  It provides basic system/software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to address
the functional safety of programmable electronics (PE), and includes the benefits of implementing
a system/software safety program.
•  2.1  System Safety (Part 2) and 2.2 Software Safety (Part 3).—These reports draw heavily
from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a,b,c,d,e,f,g]
and other standards.  The scope is “surface and underground safety-related mining systems
employing embedded, networked, and nonnetworked programmable electronics.”  System safety
seeks to design safety into all phases of the entire system.  Software is a subsystem; thus, software
safety is a part of the system’s safety.
•  3.0  Safety File (Part 4).—This report contains the documentation that demonstrates the
level of safety built into the system and identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation.
In essence, it is a “proof of safety” that the system and its operation meet the appropriate level of
safety for the intended application.  It starts from the beginning of the design, is maintained during
the full life cycle of the system, and provides administrative support for the safety program of the
full system.
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Figure 1.—The safety framework and associated guidance.
•  4.0  Safety Assessment (Part 5).—The independent assessment of the safety file is
addressed.  It establishes consistent methods to determine the completeness and suitability of safety
evidence and justifications.  This assessment could be conducted by an independent third party.
•  Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to supplement the safety framework reports
with guidance providing users with additional information.  The purpose is to assist users in
applying the concepts presented.  In other words, the safety framework is what needs to be done and
the guidance is how it can be done.  The guidance information reinforces the concepts, describes
various methodologies that can be used, and gives examples and references.  It also gives
information on the benefits and drawbacks of various methodologies.  The guidance reports are not
intended to promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject material.
They provide information and references so that the user can more intelligently choose and
implement the appropriate methodologies given the user’s application and capabilities.  The
guidance reports comprise parts 6 through 9 of the series and are listed below:
<  5.1  System Safety Guidance (Part 6).—This guidance supplements 2.1  System Safety.
<   5.2  Software Safety Guidance (Part 7).—This guidance supplements 2.2  Software Safety.
<  6.0  Safety File Guidance (Part 8).—This guidance supplements 3.0  Safety File.
<  7.0  Independent Functional Safety Assessment Guidance (Part 9).—This guidance
  supplements 4.0  Independent Functional Safety Assessment.
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BACKGROUND
The mining industry is using programmable electronics (PE) technology to improve safety, increase
productivity, and improve mining’s competitive position.  It is an emerging technology for mining
that is growing in diverse areas, including longwall mining systems, automated haulage, mine
monitoring systems, and mine processing equipment.  Although PE provides many benefits, it adds
a level of complexity that, if not properly considered, may adversely affect worker safety [Sammarco
et al. 1997].  This emerging technology can create new hazards or worsen existing ones.
PE technology has unique failure modes that are different from mechanical systems or hard-wired
electronic systems traditionally used in mining.
The use of a safety life cycle helps to ensure that safety is applied in a systematic manner for all
phases of the system, thus reducing the potential for systematic errors.  It enables safety to be
“designed in” early rather than being addressed after the system’s design is completed.  Early
identification of hazards makes it easier and less costly to address them.  The life cycle concept is
applied during the entire life of the system since hazards can become evident at later stages or new
hazards can be introduced by system modifications.  The safety life cycle for mining is an adaptation
of the safety life cycle in part 1 of IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a].
System safety activities include identifying hazards, analyzing the risks, designing to eliminate or
reduce hazards, and using this approach over the entire system life cycle.  These system safety
activities start at the system level and flow down to the subsystems and components.  More detailed
information on the fundamentals of system safety is presented by Sammarco et al. [2001].
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 The Safety Life Cycle
The safety life cycle is a core concept throughout the System Safety document 2.1 [Sammarco and
Fisher 2001].  Section 5.0 of this document presents an overview of the safety life cycle. The various
life cycle phases are listed and briefly described in Table 1 below.
Table 1.—Safety life cycle overview
(adapted from IEC [1998a])
Life cycle phase Objectives
  1.  Define scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To determine the boundaries for the PE system and to bound the hazard and risk
   analysis.
  2.  Hazards and risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . To identify and analyze hazards, event sequences leading to hazards, and the risk
   of hazardous events.
  3.  Overall safety requirements . . . . . . . . . . To specify the safety functions and associated safety integrity for the safety
   system(s).
  4.  Designate safety-critical areas . . . . . . . To assign safety functions to various PE-based and non-PE-based safety systems
   and protection layers.  To assign safety integrity levels (SILs).
  5.  Operation and maintenance plan . . . . . To plan how to operate, maintain, and repair the PE-based safety system to
   ensure functional safety.
  6.  Safety validation plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To plan how to validate that the PE-based safety system meets the safety
   requirements.
  7.  Installation and commissioning plan . . . To plan how to install and commission the PE-based safety system in a safe
   manner and to ensure that functional safety is achieved.
  8.  Management of change plan . . . . . . . . . To plan how to ensure that changes will not adversely impact functional safety.
   To plan how to systematically make and track changes.
  9.  Design for safety systems . . . . . . . . . . . To design and create the PE-based safety system.  To follow safety practices for
   the PE-based safety system and the basic system design.
10.  Additional safety technology . . . . . . . . . As needed; not within the scope of this report.
11.  External risk reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As needed; not within the scope of this report.
12.  Install and commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . To install and commission the safety system properly and safely.
13.  Validate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To carry out the safety validation plan.
14.  Operate and maintain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To operate, maintain, and repair the PE-based safety system so that functional
   safety is maintained.
15.  Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To make all modifications in accordance with the management of change plan.
16.  Decommission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To ensure the appropriate functional safety during and after decommissioning.
1.2 Scope
1.2.1 Surface and underground mining systems using PE for control or monitoring of safety-
critical mining systems and functions are within the scope.  It is not intended to apply to handheld
instruments; however, many of these principles would be useful in designing and assessing this
equipment.
1.2.2 Systems, protection layers, and devices using PE that are associated with the system are
within the scope.  These include—
•   Mining control and monitoring systems (MCMSs) using PE
•   Safety instrumented systems (SISs)
•   Critical alarms
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1.3 General
1.3.1 This guidance does not supersede federal or state laws and regulations.
1.3.2 This guidance is not equipment- or application-specific.
1.3.3 This guidance is informative; it does not serve as a compliance document.
1.3.4 This guidance applies to the entire life cycle for the mining system.
1.3.5 This guidance applies mainly to the safety-related parts of the system.  However, the
guidance can also be applied to the basic system.
2.0 Key Documents
This guidance document provides supplemental guidance information for the Independent
Functional Safety Assessment document 4.0 [Sammarco and Fries 2003].
3.0 Definitions
The definitions are directly from IEC 61508, part 4 [IEC 1998d].  Some definitions are adaptations
or newly formed definitions specific to mining.
1oo2D – A dual-channel system with diagnostics.  This system can tolerate one fault.
Channel – Components or subsystems operating together to perform a function.  Components and
subsystems within a channel include input/output modules, logic systems, sensors, power systems,
and final elements.
Common Cause Failure – A failure resulting from one or more events, causing coincident failure
of two or more channels of a multichannel system, thus leading to system failure.
Dangerous Failure – A failure having the potential to put the safety-related system in a dangerous
or fail-to-function state.
NOTE 1: The probability of a dangerous failure is 8D.
Diagnostic Coverage – The fractional decrease in the probability of dangerous hardware failure









NOTE 2: The definition may also be represented in terms of Equation 1, where DC is the diagnostic coverage, 8DD
is the probability of detected dangerous failures, and 8total is the probability of total dangerous failures.
NOTE 3: Diagnostic coverage may exist for the whole or parts of a safety-related system.  For example, diagnostic
coverage may exist for sensors and/or logic systems and/or final elements.
NOTE 4: The term “safe diagnostic coverage” is used to describe the decrease in the probability of safe hardware
failures resulting from the operation of the automatic diagnostic tests.
Dual Channel – Two channels that independently perform the same function.
Error – A discrepancy between a computed, observed, or measured value or condition and the true,
specified, or theoretically correct value or condition.
Failure – The termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function.
Fault – An abnormal condition or state that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of
a functional unit to perform a required function.
NOTE 5: A “failure” is an event.
NOTE 6: A “fault” is a state.  Faults are random or systematic.
Field Devices – Field devices include sensors, transmitters, operator interface devices (e.g., displays,
control panels, pendant controllers), actuators, wiring, and connectors.  Field devices are peripheral
devices hard-wired to the input/output terminals of a logic system.
Hazard – Environmental or physical condition that can cause injury to people, property, or the
environment.
Human-machine Interface – The physical controls, input devices, information displays, or other
media through which a human operator interacts with a machine for the purpose of operating the
machine.
Mining Control and/or Monitoring System (MCMS) – A system, using programmable electronics
(PE), that responds to input signals from the equipment under control and/or from an operator and
generates output signals, causing the equipment under control to operate in the desired manner.
Mishap – An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury, occupational illness, or
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.  In the real world,
complete freedom from adverse events is not possible.  Therefore, the goal is to attain an acceptable
level of safety.
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) – A value that indicates the probability of a system
failing to respond on demand for a safety function.  The average probability of a system failing to
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respond to a demand in a specified time interval is referred to as “PFDavg”.  PFD pertains to
dangerous failure modes.
Programmable Electronics (PE) – Refers to electronically programmable or configurable devices
(e.g., embedded controller, programmable logic controller, single-loop digital controller, distributed
control system controller) that are effectively the “brain” of a PE system.
Programmable Electronic System (PES) – Any system used to control, monitor, or protect
machinery, equipment, or a facility that has one or more programmable electronics (PE), including
all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways
and other communications paths, and actuators and other output devices.
Random Hardware Failure – A failure, occurring at a random time, that results from one or more
of the possible degradation mechanisms in the hardware.
NOTE 7: There are many degradation mechanisms occurring at different rates in different components.  Since
manufacturing tolerances cause components to fail due to these mechanisms after different times in operation, failures
of equipment comprising many components occur at predictable rates, but at unpredictable (i.e., random) times.
NOTE 8: A major distinguishing feature between random hardware failures and systematic failures is that system
failure rates (or other appropriate measures) arising from random hardware failures can be predicted with reasonable
accuracy, but systematic failures, by their very nature, cannot be accurately predicted.  That is, system failure rates
arising from random hardware failures can be quantified with reasonable accuracy, but those arising from systematic
failures cannot be accurately statistically quantified because the events leading to them cannot be easily predicted.
Risk – The combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and severity of that harm.
Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) – A measure of lowering the probability of an event from happening.
RRF ' inherent risk/acceptable risk, or RRF ' 1/PFD.
Safe Failure – A failure that does not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a
dangerous or fail-to-function state.
NOTE 9: A safe failure is also known as a nuisance failure, false-trip failure, spurious failure, or fail-to-safe failure.
Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) – The fraction of safe failures and dangerous detected failures in






















Safety – Freedom from unacceptable risk.
Safety Availability – Fraction of time that a safety system is able to perform its designated safety
service when the process is operating (safety availability ' 1 & PFD).
Safety Function – A function implemented by single or multiple MCMSs, protection layers, and
devices using PE intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for a specific hazardous event.
Safety Instrumented System (SIS) – System composed of sensors, logic solvers, and final control
elements for the purpose of taking the mining system to a safe state when predetermined conditions
are violated.  Other terms commonly used include “emergency shutdown system,” “safety shutdown
system,” and “safety interlock system.”
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) – One of three possible discrete integrity levels (SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3)
of safety instrumented functions.  SILs are defined by quantitative or qualitative methods.  SIL 3 has
the highest level of safety integrity (see Tables 2–3).
Table 2.—Assignment of SIL values for low-demand modes of operation
SIL







1 . . . . . . 10–1 to 10–2 10–     100         Method-dependent.
2 . . . . . . 10–2 to 10–3 100–  1,000         Method-dependent.
3 . . . . . . 10–3 to 10–4 1,000–10,000         Method-dependent.
Table 3.—Assignment of SIL values for high-demand (continuous) modes of operation





1 . . . . . 10–5 to 10–6 100,000–    1,000,000 Method-dependent.
2 . . . . . 10–6 to 10–7 1,000,000–  10,000,000 Method-dependent.
3 . . . . . 10–7 to 10–8 10,000,000–100,000,000 Method-dependent.
NOTE 10: SILs apply to safety functions of systems, protection layers, and devices using PE.
NOTE 11: A low-demand mode of operation is when the safety-related system’s frequency of operation is less than
once per year or no greater than twice the frequency of tests (proof tests) to detect failures in the safety-related system.
A high-demand mode of operation is when the safety-related system’s frequency of operation is more than once per year
or greater than twice the frequency of tests (proof tests) to detect failures in the safety-related system.
Safety Life Cycle – The necessary activities involved in the implementation of safety-critical
systems.  The activities begin at the concept stage and cease after the systems’ decommissioning.
System – Set of elements that interact according to a design, where an element of a system can be
another system, called a subsystem, which may be a controlling system or a controlled system and
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may include hardware, software, and human interaction.  Hardware, software, and humans can be
system elements.
Systematic Failure – A failure related to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a
modification of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation,
or other relevant factors.
NOTE 12: Corrective maintenance without modification will usually not eliminate the failure cause.
NOTE 13: A systematic failure can be induced by simulating the failure cause.
NOTE 14: Example causes of systematic failures include human error in the—
•   Safety requirements specification
•   Design, manufacture, installation, operation of the hardware
•   Design, implementation, etc., of the software
Subsystem – An element of a system.
Total Failures – The combination of all safe and dangerous failures where:
8total ' (E8S % G8D) (4)
Validation – The activity of demonstrating that the safety system under consideration, before or
after installation, meets in all respects the safety requirements specification for that safety system.
Verification – The activity of demonstrating for each phase of the relevant safety life cycle by
analysis and/or tests that, for the specific inputs, the deliverables meet in all respects the objectives
and requirements set for the specific phase.
4.0 Independent Functional Safety Assessment
4.1 Objectives
An independent functional safety assessment (IFSA) is a systematic analysis and study, based on
evidence, to judge the functional safety achieved by one or more of the programmable electronics
and software components.  A typical IFSA involves determining whether—
• The actual procedures and rules adhere to the planned procedures and rules
• The planned procedures and rules are implemented effectively and suitably to achieve the
specified safety objectives
• The appropriate methods, techniques, and processes have been used to—
<  Identify and analyze all reasonably foreseeable hazards and risks
<  Mitigate the identified hazards and risks to achieve an appropriate level of safety
<  Assign SILs
<  Verify that the SIL is met
<  Document the system with a safety file document
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IFSAs benefit both the manufacturer and the purchaser by providing necessary confidence as to the
safety integrity of the PES.  Preliminary assessments during the design of the PES electronics and
software can result in early detection of problems, including inadequacies in the fail-safe design.
Thus, early detection allows corrections to be made more effectively and efficiently.  Secondly, the
potential for a better safety assessment exists because the assessor(s) can potentially become more
familiar with the development process and build the level of understanding at each assessment
milestone.
4.2 Scope
As shown in Figure 2, the IFSA is an independent examination of the safety policy/strategy, staffing
qualifications, and the functional safety life cycle (FSLC) practices for a PES to determine
compliance with specified safety objectives.  An IFSA is conducted by an independent assessor who
reviews the safety file.  The assessor’s degree of independence depends on the SIL requirements for
the safety functions.  The Independent Functional Safety Assessment document 4.0 [Sammarco and
Fries 2003] identifies the recommended degree of assessor independence. This information is
replicated in Table 4 below.
Figure 2.—Scope of independent functional safety assessments.
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Table 4.—Recommended degree of independence of assessor
Degree of independence SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
Independent person . . . . . . . . . . HR HR nr
Independent department . . . . . . — HR HR
Third party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — HR
HR = highly recommended.    nr = not recommended.
A dash ( — ) indicates no recommendation.
Source:  Adapted from IEC [1998a].
4.3 Types of Independent Functional Safety Assessments (IFSAs)
The number and timing of the IFSAs will depend on the scope, complexity, safety integrity
objectives, prior experience of the project staff, and corporate management practices.  The greater
the SIL requirement, the more comprehensive and frequent the IFSAs.  MCMS manufacturers may
conduct IFSAs incrementally and in parallel to the daily engineering and use activities.
Three types of IFSAs are recommended [Sammarco and Fries 2003] and are summarized below:
• Preliminary Independent Functional Safety Assessment – A review of the MCMS staffing,
development plans, and preliminary safety file conducted after the planning and safety
requirements specification (phase 8 in the life cycle).
• Initial Functional Safety Assessment – An IFSA conducted during the realization phase of the
FSLC, typically after design (phase 9 in the life cycle).
• Followup Functional Safety Assessment – An assessment conducted periodically after the
MCMS has been released and is in use (during operation, maintenance, and decommissioning
—phases 14, 15, and 16 in the life cycle).
The preliminary independent functional safety assessment is optional, though recommended, for new
MCMS projects, project teams, and SILs 2 and 3.  The initial functional safety assessment addresses
the complete system and the full development life cycle once the system is installed and
commissioned.  The followup functional safety assessment addresses changes and modifications to
the system during operation, and it verifies the MCMS supplier’s continued capability to maintain
the appropriate safety integrity level for the MCMS.
Figure 3 shows an example project schedule for the fictitious continuous mining (CM) machine
described in the example of a preliminary IFSA for a SIL 3 emergency stop function.  The IFSAs
are planned at the start of the project.  Because the guidance is new, a preliminary independent
functional safety assessment is planned once all project plans are in place and the safety
requirements specification is at a point where design can begin.  The initial functional safety
assessment is planned when the design is complete.  Two followup functional safety assessments are
planned—one for a planned upgrade and one at the end of decommissioning.  In addition, periodic
followup IFSAs may be added to address risks associated with unplanned modification activity.
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4.4 Independent Functional Safety Assessments (IFSAs) and the Safety File
Traceability is important to reaching closure for the identified hazards.  Populating the safety file
with deliverables from each phase permits selecting hazards and tracing them from the hazard/risk
analyses, through specifications and safety function allocation, to design, and verification. Thus,
a thorough review of the safety file provides evidence that the selected hazard was addressed,
designed for, and resolved in an acceptable manner.
A manufacturer may also organize the MCMS safety file into subsystem and component safety files.
Such an organization may be practical when MCMSs are assembled from components and
subsystems acquired from sources outside of the project.  The supplier provides safety file
documentation when it provides the subsystems and components.  As part of the independent
functional safety assessment, the subsystem and component safety files may be consulted.
Figure 4 illustrates how a safety file for a particular machine model may reference other safety
files for specific subsystems and components.  For example, the emergency stop system for a
CM machine has separately compiled files for the sensor subsystem, the PE subsystem, and the
electrical subsystem.  These files may further reference safety files for components.
Figure 3.—Example of IFSAs integrated with a project development schedule.
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An advantage to the organization shown is that the subsystem and component safety files may be
reused.  For example, if Acme decides to build a Model 12 continuous miner that uses the
emergency stop system, then the company could potentially reuse the emergency stop system as is
or with some updating, depending on the conditions of use and whether parts have been replaced.
4.5 Common Weaknesses of Safety Files
The independent assessment process primarily relies on the safety file documentation.  The quality
of each safety file will vary because of the following factors:
•   Degree of system complexity
•   Degree of technical expertise and knowledge
•   Degree of safety management expertise and knowledge 
Although each safety file is unique, there are weaknesses common among safety files that are
important to recognize during the independent assessment process.  These include—
•   Omission of credible hazards
•   Narrow focus on only the obvious or well-known hazards
•   Vague hazard descriptions
•   Undocumented assumptions
•   Incomplete safety requirements
•   Insufficient data to support a safety claim
•   Overly optimistic estimates for the likelihood of human error
•   Unrealistic SIL targets (i.e., SIL targets set too high or low)
Acme Mining Machine Company
Continuous Mining Machine Series X
Model 11






















Figure 4.—Organization of the safety file for Acme Model X11 continuous miner.
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4.6 Example of a Preliminary IFSA for an SIL 3 Emergency Stop Function
The example report is completed to the level of a preliminary independent functional safety
assessment.  The IFSA is based on the safety file example presented in the Safety File Guidance
document 6.0 [Sammarco, forthcoming].  A complete independent functional safety assessment
could be conducted once the safety file contains a complete software design description and test
results.
Appendix A contains an example of a checklist, as completed by the assessor, for the safety data and
methods and the conclusion portions of the safety file. 
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PURPOSE/SCOPE
Provide a preliminary independent functional safety assessment of the emergency stop system
to be used on the Acme Model X11 continuous miner.  The objective is to provide an early
independent functional safety assessment of the SIL(s) so as to reduce the potential for costly
rework at the final stages of assessment because of an inappropriate assignment of SIL(s).
On February 28, 2005, a preliminary assessment of functional safety practices for an emergency
stop system used on the Acme Model X11 continuous miner was conducted.  The preliminary
assessment focused on the safety requirements activities for the emergency stop safety function.
This safety function (SF) is identified as SF 5.  The assessment reviewed the assignment of
SIL 3 to SF 5 and the allocation of SF 5 to hardware and software components.  John Doe and
Mary Johnson of Acme Machine Company and Jill Hill of International Functional Safety
Assessors, Inc., participated in the preliminary assessment.
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
The emergency stop system was designed for the Model X11 continuous miner as designed and
built by Acme Machine Company.  The CM machines are designed for use in underground coal
mining applications in North America and Australia.
The safety function SF 5 is to be implemented by the emergency stop system to mitigate the
risks of hazards H1, loss of tram control, and H2, unexpected machine movement.  The
emergency stop function was assigned to two independent layers of protection.
The first protection layer is automatically invoked by the programmable logic controller (PLC)
to place the tram subsystem in a safe state of “deenergized.”  The protection layer uses the
output monitoring technique where the tram motor current is monitored and compared to the
desired state of the machine.  If an unsafe condition exists, i.e., the tram motors are energized
when they should be off, the protection layer will shut down power to the tram subsystem.  The
protection hardware (Figures 5–6) consists of a tram motor current sensor, a dual-channel safety
PLC, and a circuit breaker connected to the tram motor subsystem.
The second protection layer is manually invoked by humans.  The design uses two switches
directly wired to the mainline circuit breaker (Figure 7).  Depressing either of the two switches
causes a loss of control voltage to the line circuit breaker located on the CM machine, thereby
causing the circuit breaker to trip, which shuts down the CM machine.  The design can be
abstracted as a sensor, logic solver, and field device.
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     Figure 5.—Conceptual design for the first layer of protection that is automatically invoked by the
dual-channel safety PLC.
Figure 6.—Redundant dual-channel hardware architecture for the 1oo2D safety PLC.
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     Figure 7.—Conceptual design for the second layer of protection that is manually invoked by depressing
the emergency stop switch.
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FINDINGS
NOTE 16:      These findings address only five items of the safety file:  (1) the safety requirements, (2) the safety
requirements allocation, (3) the emergency stop, (4) software development, and (5) safety file documentation. 
Typically, the findings would address a more comprehensive list of items.
Table 5.—Assessor checklist of findings
Item Item Details
Part 2:













Section 6.3.2 Section 5.6.1.6
System-level Safety
Requirements




seems vague.  Perhaps
the testing requirements
are part of the mainte-









Section 6.3.4 Section 5.6.1.6
System-level Safety
Requirements
Accepted SIL 3 assigned to hazards
H1 and H2.
These SIL assignments






Section 6.3.7 Section 5.6.1.6
System-level Safety
Requirements
Accepted The safety requirements
specification contains the
information components of












Section 6.4.1 Section 5.1
Executive Summary
(Safety Statement)
Accepted Safety function SF 5
addresses hazard H1 –
loss of tram control, and





























Section 6.4.4 Sections 5.6.5.1,
5.6.5.2
Discussion with





Accepted There are two layers of
protection.
See footnotes at end of table.
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Table 5.—Assessor checklist of findings—Continued
Item Item Details
Part 2:


























Accepted Protection layer 1 is inte-












it designed to the
level of rigor
required for the
highest SIL of its
safety functions?
Section 6.4.6 Sections 5.7.1.2,
5.7.2
Accepted Protection layer 2 is













Section 6.4.7 Section 5.7.1.2 Accepted The redundant compo-
nents take common cause
into account by using the
















ing design rationale and
tradeoffs is needed.  The
PLC is shared for control
and safety functions.  Also,
the design shares existing
wiring from the PLC to the
circuit breaker.  Were
other technologies
considered for the manu-
ally actuated emergency
stop, such as a hard-wired
design that would be
simpler to design, validate,
verify, and maintain?
See footnotes at end of table.
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Table 5.—Assessor checklist of findings—Continued
Item Item Details
Part 2:






















PLC mounting and emer-
gency stop switches are
physically separated 5 feet






not progressed to a point
where this checklist item
can be fully determined. 



















Accepted Pushbutton switches are
used requiring one stroke. 




















the switches to be readily
accessible and clearly
defined.
The design is at the pre-
liminary stage, so no
hardware has been built to
verify if this was
implemented.
1Sections and appendices cited refer to the System Safety document 2.1 [Sammarco and Fisher 2001].
2Sections cited refer to the Safety File Guidance document 6.0 [Sammarco, forthcoming].
CONDITIONS OF ACCEPTABILITY
More information regarding design rationale and tradeoffs is needed.  Some of the information
will need to be added to the installation, user, and maintenance manuals.
SUMMARY
A preliminary independent functional safety assessment was completed for the emergency stop
system for the Model X11 continuous miner.  An initial functional safety assessment is
recommended after completion of the conceptual design.
All SILs are adequately designated and justified at this preliminary stage.
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NOTE 17: The preliminary IFSA typically does not include the software components.  Software is usually not
available until the initial IFSA.  The lack of software does not minimize the importance of the preliminary IFSA because
most safety-related errors occur at the requirements stage, as described in the Introduction document 1.0 [Sammarco
et al. 2001].  Specifically, a study by the U.K. Health and Safety Executive [1995] determined that requirement
specification errors were the overwhelming majority mishap causes (44.1%).
NOTE 18: This concludes section 4.6, “Example of a Preliminary IFSA for an SIL 3 Emergency Stop Function.”  The
following information concerns guidance for an initial IFSA and is separate from the emergency stop example.
5.0 Initial IFSA
The initial IFSA is described in section 5.2 of the Independent Functional Safety Assessment
document 4.0 [Sammarco and Fries 2003].  This section describes what is provided to the assessor
(the inputs), the process for assessment, and the assessment results (the outputs).  The degree of
assessor independence is shown in Table 2 of the Independent Functional Safety Assessment
document 4.0 document, where third-party assessment is recommended for SIL 3.
5.1 Third-party Assessment
Third party is defined as follows [Sammarco and Fries 2003]:
An organizational division, subsidiary, or other organization that is separate and distinct,
by management and other resources, from the organization or department responsible for
the activities, subject to functional safety assessment or validation, taking place during the
specific phase of the overall E/E/PES or software safety life cycle.
Therefore, the assessment can be conducted by an outside organization.  Appendix B lists a sampling
of third-party assessment organizations that also offer certification.
5.2 Proven in Use (Service History) as Applied to Software
Proven in use is used to establish safety integrity based on a documented safe history of use.  This
concept is detailed in section 8.0 of the Independent Functional Safety Assessment document 4.0
[Sammarco and Fries 2003].  Proven in use applies to systems, subsystems, and components.
Software is one component of a system; therefore, proven in use can be used to establish the safety
of software without the need for formal and rigorous verification.
5.2.1 Software Distinctions
Software exists in many forms.  For instance, there are commercially available software tools for
developing, testing, and validating software.  These tools are important to consider with respect to
safety and proven in use; the fact that a tool is commercially available does not justify the tool safety
integrity.  For example, compiler errors can occur and can go undetected until a mishap occurs.
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The safety assessment should take into account the various types of software, such as:
•   Compilers
•   Operating systems
•   Software function libraries
•   Application software
•   Software configuration management tools
•   Software testing tools
•   Device drivers
5.2.2 Proven-in-Use Criteria for Software
Software must have documentation to support that the likelihood of a systematic software fault is
low enough to achieve the required safety integrity level.  If previously used software has not been
verified to meet the required safety integrity level, then the assessor(s) should use the following
criteria as a guide to establish for proven in use:
• The software specification has not been changed.
• The software has been in use in a different application for at least 1 year.
• The operating experience of the software should be similar (i.e., software designed and used
for low-demand modes of operation should not be used for high-demand (continuous) modes
of operation).
• The safe service history duration, in terms of failure-free operating hours, should be as
shown in Table 6 below [Sammarco and Fries 2003].
Table 6.—Recommended safe service duration
for various SILs
SIL Hazard-freeoperating hours
1 . . . . . . . . . . 3 × 102
2 . . . . . . . . . . 3 × 103
3 . . . . . . . . . . 3 × 104
NOTE 19: A failure resulting in a fail-safe condition or state is considered hazard-free.
The documentation of software for proven in use should include:
•   Identification of the software
•   Identification of the system using the software
•   Identification of the application and service location 
•   Software version number
5.3 General Indicators of Software Quality
Software does not exhibit random wearout failures.  Instead, software failures result from logic or
design errors.
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Beizer [1990] gives an example illustrating an aspect of software complexity concerning the number
of paths for a section of code.  Given that a section of software has two loops, four branches, and
eight states, the number of paths through this code exceeds 8,000.  Therefore, it is usually
impractical to test or conduct a safety assessment of 100% of the software.
The assessor(s) should then be observant of “warning” indicators; these indicators can be useful in
identifying software for closer scrutiny:
• Software with an excessive history of revisions
• Newly developed software 
• Poorly documented software
• Software not subjected to management of change processes
• Development tool changes before the development process is completed (e.g., changing the
version or vendor of a compiler)
• Excessively large software modules (e.g., a module exceeding 500 lines of code)
• Software that was not developed systematically (e.g., lack of general coding standards or
software development life cycles)
 
NOTE 20: The indicators are general in nature and are not to be used as definitive signs of a hazardous situation;
thus, software could be safe, yet exhibit all of the suggested indicators.
5.4 Assessment of Software Verification and Validation (V&V)
The purpose of software verification and validation (V&V) is to demonstrate that the software is
correct and complete with respect to the system and software requirements and design specifications.
Numerous methods of software V&V exist.  Typically, multiple methods are needed; this is
especially true as the SIL assignment increases.  The recommended software V&V methods and the
association documentation are presented in the Software Safety document 2.2 [Fries et al. 2001].
Table 2 in the Software Safety document 2.2 lists the recommended software V&V methods for
SIL 1, SIL 2, and SIL 3.  Section 4.9 details the information requirements for software V&V.
5.4.1 Static and Dynamic Analysis Tools
One of the information requirements for software V&V is found in section 4.9 of the Software
Safety document 2.2 [Fries et al. 2001]:  description of the facilities, equipment, and software used
for testing.  This recommendation applies to software tools used for static and dynamic analysis.
Many tools are commercially available.  Table 7 lists some of the tools that an assessor would likely
encounter [Jones et al. 2001].
The use of static and dynamic analysis tools should be documented for the IFSA, as well as the tool
itself (i.e., name, supplier, version, etc.).  The assessor(s) should then check for this documentation;
insufficient documentation should be an issue of concern for the IFSA.  One exception to this
guidance is software that was proven in use.
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Table 7.—Sampling of static and dynamic analysis tools for software
Tool Name Purpose Website
PC Lint . . . . . . . . . . . C/C++ language checker.  Also supports MIRSA C check-
   ing.  Conducts more extensive checking than a compiler.
   Checks for syntax errors, initialization and value misuse,
   redundant code, etc.
www.gimpel.com
Logiscope . . . . . . . . . C, C++, Ada, and Java code checking; code coverage
   analysis.
www.telelogic.com/products/tau/logiscope 
LDRA Testbed® . . . . C/C++ language checker.  Also supports MIRSA C check-
   ing.  Conducts data flow analysis, loop analysis, struc-
   tured programming verification, control flow coverage,
   complexity analysis, etc. 
www.ldra.co.uk/testbed.asp
PolySpace . . . . . . . . Automatic detection of run-time errors.  Available for C,
   C++, MIRSA C, Ada, UML.
www.polyspace.com
Splint . . . . . . . . . . . . Static analysis tool geared for coding mistakes and security
   vulnerabilities.
www.splint.org
REFERENCES
Beizer B [1990].  Software testing techniques.  2nd ed.  London: International Thomson Computer
Press.
Fries EF, Fisher TJ, Jobes CC [2001].  Programmable electronic mining systems: best practice
recommendations (in nine parts).  Part 3: 2.2  Software safety.  Pittsburgh, PA: U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2001–164,
IC 9460.
IEC [1998a].  Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems.  Geneva, Switzerland: International Electrotechnical Commission, Draft IEC 61508–1,
Part 1: General requirements, version 4, May 12, 1998.
IEC [1998b].  Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems.  Geneva, Switzerland: International Electrotechnical Commission, Draft IEC 61508–2,
Part 2: Requirements for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems,
version 4, May 12, 1998.
IEC [1998c].  Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems.  Geneva, Switzerland: International Electrotechnical Commission, Draft IEC 61508–3,
Part 3: Software requirements, version 4, May 12, 1998.
IEC [1998d].  Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems.  Geneva, Switzerland: International Electrotechnical Commission, Draft IEC 61508–4,
Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations, version 4, May 12, 1998.
29
IEC [1998e].  Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems.  Geneva, Switzerland: International Electrotechnical Commission, Draft IEC 61508–5,
Part 5: Examples of methods for determination of safety integrity levels, version 4, May 12, 1998.
IEC [1998f].  Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems.  Geneva, Switzerland: International Electrotechnical Commission, Draft IEC 61508–6,
Part 6: Guidelines on the application of parts 2 and 3, version 4, May 12, 1998.
IEC [1998g].  Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems.  Geneva, Switzerland: International Electrotechnical Commission, Draft IEC 61508–7
Part 7: Overview of techniques and measures, version 4, May 12, 1998.
Jones C, Bloomfield RE, Froome PKD, Bishop PG [2001].  Methods for assessing the safety
integrity of safety-related software of uncertain pedigree (SOUP).  London: Adelard LLP.  Contract
research report 337/2001 for the U.K. Health and Safety Executive.
Sammarco JJ [forthcoming].  Programmable electronic mining systems: best practice
recommendations (in nine parts).  Part 8: 6.0  Safety file guidance.  Pittsburgh, PA: U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Information Circular (IC).
Sammarco JJ, Fisher TJ [2001].  Programmable electronic mining systems: best practice
recommendations (in nine parts).  Part 2: 2.1  System safety.  Pittsburgh, PA: U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2001–137,
IC 9458.
Sammarco JJ, Fries EF [2003].  Programmable electronic mining systems: best practice
recommendations (in nine parts).  Part 5: 4.0  Independent functional safety assessment.  Pittsburgh,
PA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH)
Publication No. 2003-138, IC 9464.
Sammarco JJ, Fisher TJ, Welsh JH, Pazuchanics MJ [2001].  Programmable electronic mining
systems: best practice recommendations (in nine parts).  Part 1: 1.0  Introduction.  Pittsburgh, PA:
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication
No. 2001–132, IC 9456.
Sammarco JJ, Kohler JL, Novak T, Morley LA [1997].  Safety issues and the use of software-
controlled equipment in the mining industry.  In: Proceedings of the IEEE Industrial Applications
Society 32nd Annual Meeting (New Orleans, LA, October 5–9, 1997).  New York: Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
U.K. Health and Safety Executive [1995].  Out of control: why control systems go wrong and how
to prevent failure.  Sheffield, U.K.: Health and Safety Executive.
30
APPENDIX A.—INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST
AND WORKSHEET
Checklists and worksheets are tools that can help reduce errors of omission for both the assessor and
the persons submitting the safety file by providing a systematic structure to the assessment process.
The following are examples of completed checklists for the safety data and methods and the
conclusion portions of a safety file.  Example checklists and worksheets were presented in
Appendix D of the Independent Functional Safety Assessment document 4.0 [Sammarco and Fries
2003].
SAFETY DATA AND METHODS DOCUMENTATION
Accept Reject
    X             Product description (vendor’s sales literature, general specifications, features)
   See comment 1  Implementation document
    X             User documents (operator’s manual, maintenance manual, training manual)
   See comment 1  History files
   See comment 1  Hazard log
    X             Hazard and risk analysis methods
    X             Risk categorization methods
    X             SIL categorization methods
    X             System safety requirements
    X             Software safety requirements
   Not applicable   Proven in use documentation, if applicable
Comments:
1.  These items were not provided at this preliminary stage of assessment.  It is highly recommended




    X             Summary/conclusions
   See comment 2  Signed statement affirming that the system is safe to operate
Comments:
2.  The signed statement is not applicable at this preliminary stage of assessment.
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APPENDIX B.—THIRD-PARTY ASSESSMENT ORGANIZATIONS
Below is a list of third-party organizations offering independent assessments of functional safety.
The list is not comprehensive, but it does identify organizations with substantial assessment
experience.
This list does not imply endorsement by NIOSH and does not imply that organizations not listed are
not qualified to conduct an assessment.
• Factory Mutual Research
www.fmglobal.com/approvals/approved/categories/safety.asp
• TÜV Rheinland Group Industrial Services
www.tuv-fs.com/ctpolicy.htm
• Underwriter Laboratories, Inc.
www.ul.com/software
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